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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PRESUMPTIONS IN CIVIL CASES:
PROCEDURAL EFFECTS UNDER MARYLAND LAW
IN STATE AND FEDERAL FORUMS
The author surveys the effects of presumptions in civil cases and
examines the Maryland decisions on the subject. Observing the
divergence between the "bursting bubble" theory of presumptions embodied in Rule 301 of the new Federal Rules of
Evidence and the tendency in Maryland to accord presumptions
a greater procedural significance, the author scrutinizes the
federal-state choice of law question under Federal Rule 302.
INTRODUCTION
It is doubtful that any subject within the law of evidence has
prompted more commentary, provoked more argument, or engendered
more controversy than the subject of presumptions. 1 A primary source
of confusion has been semantics-what a presumption is definitionally,
what is included within the term, and what effect a presumption has
when it appears in a case. As reporter for the Model Code of Evidence,
Professor Morgan commented:
It would be easy to demonstrate that the law as to
presumptions is even more in need of simplication than that
relating to hearsay. The confusion in the cases is due in part to
the use of inaccurate terminology and the consequent misapplication of precedents, in part to faulty analysis and careless
presentation by counsel, and in part to the generally accepted
assumption that all presumptions are to be given the same
procedural effect.2

The problem is compounded by the enormous number of presumptions, the fact that presumptions are created, or are recognized, for
different reasons, 3 and the fact that presumptions appear in a limitless
variety of contexts. 4

1. See C. McCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 345, at 826 (2d
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]; Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. REV.
391 (1956); Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 VAND. L. REV. 324 (1952).
2. Morgan, Forward, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 1, 52 (1942), quoted in Gausewitz,
Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 V AND. L. REV. 324 (1952). Although written
thirty·four years ago, these words are no less accurate today.
3. Professor Morgan lists seven reasons for the creation of presumptions:
1. To make unnecessary the introduction of evidence upon an issue made by
the pleadings but not likely to be the subject of serious dispute ....
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The Maryland decisions involving the application of presumptions in
civil cases demonstrate several points valuable to a preliminary
perspective. First, Maryland may be said to fall within a general rule
that there is little variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction as to which
presumptions are recognized, and virtually no variation with respect to
the more frequently-occurring presumptions, whether acknowledged by
decision or statute. 5 Second, as a single jurisdiction, Maryland is not
vulnerable to Professor Morgan's criticism. Maryland has never dogmatically embraced a one-rule approach on the effect of presumptions.
Rather, the Maryland courts appear to have appreciated the complexity
of the problem in following a case-by-case or presumption-bypresumption approach. This cauti6n has avoided conflict in the cases
but has resulted in a relative state of underdevelopment. Finally, as one
of many, however, Maryland has contributed to the discord among the
jurisdictions in the treatment of presumptions, for a line of Maryland
cases has woven a thread of dissent in the fabric of traditional
presumption law.
As a result of the Erie doctrine, 6 applicability in federal forums has
become an important aspect of state presumption law. Among the
recently enacted Federal Rules of Evidence 7 are two rules concerning
presumptions in civil cases. s Rule 301 prescribes the effect to be given
presumptions in cases governed by federal law.9 Rule 302 prescribes

4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

2. To avoid a procedural impasse in a situation where evidence as to the
presumed fact is lacking ....
3. To avoid such an impasse created by the impossibility of securing legally
competent evidence of the presumed fact ....
4. To produce a result in accord with the preponderance of probability,
"common experience shows the facts to be so generally true that courts may notice
the truth." ...
5. To require the party having peculiar means of access to the facts and
evidence of the facts to make them known to the court ....
6. To reach a result deemed socially desirable wherever the basic fact
exists....
7. To reach a result deemed desirable for a combination of two or more of the
foregoing reasons.... E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 32·33 (1963).
As a consequence of these difficulties, those who would comment upon the law of
presumptions, as distinguished from comment upon a single presumption, must reckon
with this dilemma: it is at once meaningless to discuss the subject without reference to
particular presumptions and practically impossible to do so with reference to all
presumptions. A compromise is commanded: although generality necessitates exemplification, when distinctions are called for, they will be made.
The rule, however, is not without exception. For example, the Maryland legislature has
abolished the common law presumption of death from proof of unexplained absence for
seven years or more. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-102 (1974).
Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Fed. Rules Evid., 28 V.S.C.A. (1975).
Although the Supreme Court promulgated a rule dealing with presumptions in criminal
cases, the Congress deleted this rule. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973).
Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 301, 28 V.S.C.A. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rule 301]:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of
Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the
presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of
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when state law controls the effect of presumptions in federal courts. 10
In federal court cases in which the potentially applicable state law has
followed the traditional view on the effect of presumptions embodied
in Rule 301, the choice of law is without significance. The Maryland
cases, however, reflect a trend toward according presumptions a greater
procedural effect than Rule 301. As a result, insofar as Maryland is
concerned, the choice between state law and federal law, and thus the
scope of Rule 302, may assume dispositive significance.
PRESUMPTIONS IN CIVIL CASES
The only statement which can be made about presumptions without
contradiction or exception is that a rebuttable presumption of law l l is
an evidentiary rule of law which compels the finding of a particular fact
(the presumed fact) upon proof of a basic fact or set of facts,t2 in the
absence of evidence to the contrary Y Beyond this, reference must be
made to th~ theoretical notions behind presumptions and to their
operation, or treatment, in practice.
Every presumption recognized is founded upon one or both of two
general values. A presumption may exist because of the inferential
probative value of a standardized, basic set of facts. The most
frequently occurring example of this type of presumption is the
presumption of receipt arising from proof of proper mailing: "[T] estimony of a witness that he properly addressed, stamped and mailed a
letter raises a presumption that it reached its destination at the regular
time and was received by the person to whom it was addressed. "14 The
inference of receipt is supported or bolstered by the regularity and
reliability of the nation's mail service. IS Some presumptions, on the

10.

11.

12.

13.
14.

15.

the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on
whom it was originally cast.
Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 302,28 U.S.C.A. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rule 302]:
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a
fact which is an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the
rule of decision is determined in accordance with State law.
The term "presumption of fact" is often used to describe the rational inference which
may arise from a particular fact or set of facts. If a rule of law respecting the allocation
of the burden of proof attaches to the basic fact or facts, it is a presumption of law. If
not, it is not a presumption at all. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491, at 288·89 (3d ed.
1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. REV. 391,
392 (1956). Whether or not "conclusive presumptions," often called "presumptions of
law," should be embraced by the term, id. at 391, they are not dealt with here, for they
are rules of substantive law, not of evidence. See United Life & Accident Ins. Co. v.
Prostic, 169 Md. 535, 540, 182 A. 421, 423 (1936).
It is commonly said that a presumption arises upon proof of the underlying facts which
give rise inferentially to the presumed fact. MCCORMICK 820; WIGMORE § 2490 at 288.
This, of course, assumes that all presumptions are founded upon a basic fact or set of
facts which are circumstantially probative of the fact to be presumed. However, all
presumptions are not of this sort, and some appear to arise without proof of any basic
fact or facts. See p. 303·05 infra.
MCCORMICK 820; WIGMORE § 2491, at 289.
Kolker v. Biggs, 203 Md. 137, 144,99 A.2d 743, 746 (1953).
Id., 99 A.2d at 747.
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other hand, arise upon proof of the basic facts, not as a consequence of
their probative value, but because of public policy. In many jurisdictions, when it is shown that a person has not been heard from by his
relatives for seven years or more, despite efforts to locate him, in the
absence of an explanation of the disappearance, there is a presumption
that the person is dead. 16 "The presumption is arbitrary, connected
with neither reason nor logic but founded upon a public policy that
important social and property rights shall not remain indefinitely in
abeyance because of the impossibility of proving by real evidence the
life or death of such person upon whose life such rights depend." 17
Other presumptions which are primarily grounded in public policy are
underpinned by a basic fact or set of facts which, at least as a matter of
statistical probability, indicates the existence of the fact which public
policy demands be presumed. By statute in Maryland, "[a] child born
or conceived during a marriage is presumed to be the legitimate child of
both spouses,,,18 and "a child born at any time after his parents have
participated in a marriage ceremony with each other, even if the
marriage is invalid, is presumed to be the legitimate child of both
parents. ,,19 Similarly, in actions for personal injuries caused by an
automobile not driven by the owner, proof of ownership of the vehicle
raises a presumption that the driver was a servant of the owner acting
within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.20 This
presumption is supported, in policy, by the assumed superior access of
the owner to information concerning the operation of his car and by a
preference that a vehicle owner should shoulder broader responsibility
for harm caused by his instrumentality.21
There are presumptions which appear to arise without proof of any
underlying facts. For example, "the law presumes that every person is
sane and possesses the requisite mental capacity to execute [a legal
instrument] ."22 The cases do not indicate that the person who would

16. E.g., Borzage v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 6 Conn. Cir. 269, 270 A.2d 688 (1970).
Although once recognized in Maryland, Robb v. Horsey, 169 Md. 227, 234·36, 181 A.
348, 351·52 (1935), this common law presumption has been abolished by statute. MD.
ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3·102 (1974).
17. Robb v. Horsey, 169 Md. 227, 235, 181 A. 348, 351 (1935). The Maryland Court of
Appeals made this observation before the legislative abolition of the presumption.
18. MD. ANN. CODE, Est. & Tr. Art., § 1·206(a) (1974).
19. [d. Both presumptions are made rebuttable by MD. ANN. CODE, Est. & Tr. Art.,
§ 1.105(b) (1974).
20. E.g., Grier v. Rosenberg, 213 Md. 248, 131 A.2d 737 (1957). In Martin Furniture Corp.
v. Yost, 247 Md. 42,49·50,230 A.2d 338,342 (1967), the court of appeals pointed out
that this situation really involves two presumptions-a presumption of agency on
behalf of the owner and a presumption that the agent was acting within the scope of his
employment. Thus the presumption regarding the scope of employment operated against
an admitted principal who had leased but did not own the car. [d. at 51, 230 A.2d at
343.
21. McCORMICK 822. This presumption may, as well, rest on the inferential value of the fact
of ownership. See note 82 & p. 314 infra.
22. Gordon v. Rawles, 201 Md. 503, 512, 94 A.2d 465, 469·70 (1953).
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rely upon the presumption need make any showing to raise it.23 In
personal injury cases, there is a presumption that a deceased or
incapacitated person was in the exercise of due care at the time of the
accident.24 Unless death or incapacity be regarded as the triggering
fact, this presumption also arises without proof of a prerequisite
foundation.
As stated above, it is universally held that a presumption requires the
trier of fact to find the existence of the presumed fact in the absence of
contradictory evidence. 25 The confusion and discrepancies in the
treatment of presumptions by different courts appear when contrary
evidence is adduced by the party against whom the presumption
operates. 26 Since the time of Professor Thayer's springboard work on
the law of evidence,27 and particularly since Wigmore promoted the
doctrine 28 attributed to Thayer,29 the law of presumptions has been
thoroughly dominated by the "Thayer" or "bursting bubble" theory. 30
Under the doctrine, a presumption operates in favor of a party who has
the burden of proof31 by shifting to the other party the duty of going
forward with the evidence on the issue. 32 In effect, this means that the
party relying on the presumption can get past a motion for a directed
verdict made at the close of his case without any direct proof of the
presumed fact, and may succeed with respect to that issue if the other
party does not come forward with evidence. 33 In its pure form, this is
all that a bursting bubble presumption does. Once the other party
produces evidence on the issue 34 sufficient to support a finding
contrary to the presumed fact, the bubble is burst and the presumption

23. See, e.g., Masius v. Wilson, 213 Md. 259, 131 A.2d 484 (1957); Gordon v. Rawles, 201
Md. 503, 94 A.2d 465 (1953).
24. E.g., Gresham v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 256 Md. 500, 260 A.2d 649 (1970);
Nizer v. Phelps, 252 Md. 185,249 A.2d 252 (1969).
25. P. 303 supra.
26. See MCCORMICK 820.
27. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (1898).
28. WIGMORE §§ 2490·91.
29. Dean Gausewitz examined in depth Thayer's words on presumptions and concluded that
Thayer did not intend that there should be a single rule for all presumptions, namely, the
bursting bubble rule. Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. REv. 391,406·08 (1956).
30. MCCORMICK 821.
31. Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One·Rule World, 5 VAND. L. REV. 324,339 (1952). In
dealing with presumptions, it is especially important to distinguish the two aspects of
burden of proof: the burden of persuasion, or risk of nonpersuasion, and the burden or
duty of going forward with the evidence. See 10 M.L.E., Evidence § 21, at 101 (1961).
32. MCCORMICK 821; WIGMORE § 2491, at 288.
33. MCCORMICK 820 & n. 33.
34. In the case of a presumption which arises upon proof of basic facts, the party against
whom the presumption operates may attack the presumption by contrary evidence going
to the existence of the basic facts as well as evidence going to the existence of the fact to
be presumed. In such a case, the judge should instruct the jury that if they find in favor
of the basic facts, they must find in favor of the presumed fact. McCORMICK 820. A
Maryland case exposing this distinction is Border v. Grooms, 267 Md. 100, 297 A.2d 81
(1972), involving the presumption of receipt of mailed matter from proof of proper
stamping, addressing and mailing.
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no longer exists in the case.
Accordingly, there is a corollary
proscription against mentioning the presumption or rule of law to the
jury.36
The courts of practically every jurisdiction have, at one time or
another, proclaimed adherence to the bursting bubble theory. 37
Nevertheless, courts have frequently departed from the dogma, on a
"presumption by presumption basis. ,,38 According to Morgan, the
cases reflect seven patterns of departure from or variation of the Thayer
theory "as to the condition which must be fulfilled to prevent or
modify or destroy the effect which the establishment of the basic fact
would have if it stood alone:,,39 .(1) if evidence has been presented
which is sufficient to support a finding of the nonexistence of the
presumed fact, the presumption has effect only if the trier of fact
discredits that evidence; (2) if there is such evidence, the presumption
lasts until the trier credits the evidence; (3) the presumption is taken
out of the case altogether by substantial evidence to the contrary;
(4) the presumption prevails unless the trier is persuaded that the
nonexistence of the presumed fact is as likely as its existence; (5) once
the basic facts are established, the risk of nonpersuasion as to the
presumed fact moves to the other party; (6) in the case of a
presumption founded upon the opponent's knowledge or access to
information concerning the presumed fact, the risk of nonpersuasion as
to the basic facts, but not as to the presumed fact, is shifted; (7) the
presumption is to be treated as evidence. 4o
Emphasizing that a presumption may manifest itself at trial on
motions for a directed verdict and in jury instructions,41 McCormick
dealt more specifically with the matter of possible deviations from the
Thayerian rule against mentioning the presumption to the jury. The
alternatives considered by him include instructing the jury that the
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35. MCCORMICK 821; WIGMORE § 2491, at 289. Even though the presumption disappears as a
rule of law, in a case involving a presumption founded upon the probative value of the
basic facts, the inference alone may be relied upon. MCCORMICK 821. See Border v.
Grooms, 267 Md. 100, 104, 297 A.2d 81, 83 (1972), but notice the confusion of
terminology.
One judge colorfully termed presumptions under the Thayer theory "bats of the
law, flitting in the twilight, but disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts." Mockowik
v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R.R. Co., 196 Mo. 550, 571, 94 S.W. 256, 262 (1906)
(Lamm, J.), quoted in MCCORMICK 821 and WIGMORE § 2491, at 291 n. 6.
36. MCCORMICK 821; WIGMORE § 2491, at 290; Fornoff, Presumptions-The Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 24 ARK. L. REV. 401, 405 (1971).
37. See cases and quotations collected at 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491, at 290 n. 6 (Supp.
1975). Maryland is exceptional. See p. 311-12 infra.
38. MCCORMICK 826. As a matter of precedent, McCormick's characterization is certainly
accurate, for in giving effect to a particular presumption which is in issue, a court does
not prescribe the rule for any other presumption. McCormick's overall perception of
presumption law, however, was more a catalogue of exceptions to the traditional rule
than a catalogue of individual rules. [d. at 822.
39. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 34 (1963).
40. [d. at 34-37.
41. MCCORMICK 819.
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basic facts, if established, raise a presumption in favor of the presumed
fact; that the presumption is evidence to be weighed with all of the
other evidence admitted; that the presumed fact is to be taken as true
unless the jury finds the evidence as to the existence or nonexistence of
the presumed fact to be of equal weight, in which case the issue should
be resolved against the party with the burden of persuasion; in a case
in which the basic facts are circumstantially probative of the presumed
fact, that where such basic facts exist, it is probable that the presumed
fact is true. 42 In discussing the problems involved with each approach,
McCormick saw difficulty in choosing words which would strike an
appropriate balance between implying too much and conveying too
little. 43 He saw the "best solution" as simply instructing the jury that
it must find the presumed fact unless the party against whom the
presumption operates establishes its nonexistence by a preponderance
of the evidence. 44
McCormick's "solution" was a product of his conviction that a
presumption should fix the burden of persuasion on the party against
whom it was directed, and complemented his contribution to the
academic tug-of-war on whether or not there should be a single rule for
all presumptions, and if so, what that rule should be. 45 To Professors
Bohlen46 and Morgan,47 the most sensible approach would be to assign
each presumption a procedural effect consonant with the policy behind
it. Dean Gausewitz agreed, believing that this approach called for a
different rule for different groups of presumptions. 48 Because of the
practical difficulties in administering a number of different rules,
however, Morgan 49 and Gausewitz SO ultimately concluded that there
should be one rule governing the effect of presumptions, and concurred
with McCormick51 that a presumption should shift the burden of
persuasion on the issue. McCormick deemed the primary objection to
such a rule as being the frequently stated dogma that the burden of
proof is unalterably assigned at the commencement of the trial. 52 But
the policies which underlie the allocation of the burden of persuasion 53
might be outweighed by those which give rise to presumptions, and, in
42. [d. at 825·26 & no. 59·67.
43. [d. See also Fornoff, Presumptions-The Proposed Federal Rules, 24 ARK. L. REV. 401,
407 (1971).
44. McCORMICK 826.
45. See Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One·Rule World, 5 VAND. L. REV. 324 (1952); p. 306
& note 38 supra.
46. Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of Proof, 68 U.
PA. L. REV. 307, 313 (1920).
47. See Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 255,281 (1937).
48. Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One·Rule World, 5 VAND. L. REV. 324,330 (1952).
49. E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO.AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGA.
TION 81 (1956).
50. Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One·Rule World, 5 VAND. L. REV. 324, 340·41 (1952).
51. McCORMICK 826.
52. MCCORMICK 826·27. See Fisher v. Baltimore Transit Co., 184 Md. 399, 401, 41 A.2d
297,298 (1945).
53. See note 100 infra.
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any event, the bursting bubble theory is simply inadequate to
implement presumption policy. 54 Four by-products reflect this "Battle
of Presumptions.,,55 The 1942 Model Code of Evidence propounded a
strict bursting bubble rule. 56 Under the Uniform Rules of Evidence
proposed eleven years later, a presumption founded upon circumstantially probative basic facts shifts the burden of persuasion, otherwise a
presumption has a Thayerian effect only.57 The 1965 California
Evidence Code reversed the formula of the Uniform Rules58 shifting
the burden of persuasion only with respect to presumptions founded on
public policy and the new Federal Rules of Evidence returned to a
straight bursting bubble theory in cases governed by federallaw. 59
PRESUMPTIONS IN CIVIL CASES IN MARYLAND

In any given jurisdiction, presumptions have been the subject of far
more dicta than rationes decidendi. As McCormick noted,60 in order
for an aspect of presumption law to be the ground for decision, the case
must turn on trial rulings, on motions for directed verdicts or on
instructions. With this caveat in mind, attention will now be focused on
the treatment of presumptions in Maryland.
The most significant case on the Maryland presumption landscape is
Grier u. Rosenberg,61 in which the court of appeals reversed a
judgment against a personal injury plaintiff upon a jury verdict for the
defendant car owner, and ordered a new trial because the trial court
refused to instruct the jury that "if the jury found as a fact ownership
of the car in [defendant Rosenberg], there arose a rebuttable
presumption that the automobile was being operated by [Rosenberg]
or by his agent, servant and/or employee acting within the scope of the
agent's, servant's and/or employee's employment.,,62 The state of the
evidence is crucial to an understanding of the significance of any case in
the field of presumptions, which so intimately involves burdens of
proof.

54. See McCORMICK 822, 826·27; Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. REV.
(1956). As Morgan stated:

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

62.

391, 404

Just as the courts have come to recognize that there is no a priori formula for
fixing the burden of persuasion, so they should recognize that if there is a good
reason for putting on one party or the other the burden of going forward with
evidence ... it ought to be good enough to control a finding when the mind of
the trier is in equilibrium. E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE
ANGLO· AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 81 (1956).
Wyckoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 173 Ore. 592, 595, 147 P.2d 227,229
(1944).
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 704 (1942).
UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 14(a)-(b).
CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 603-06 (West 1966).
Rule 301.
P. 306 & note 41 supra.
213 Md. 248, 131 A.2d 737 (1957).
[d. at 252, 131 A.2d at 738-39.
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Grier had alleged personal injury caused to her by the sudden stop of
a Baltimore City bus on which she was a passenger. 63 The testimony
tended to show that the bus had to stop quickly to avoid a collision
with an automobile owned by Rosenberg which darted into the path of
the bus and then left the scene. The court of appeals synopsized
Rosenberg's rebuttal:
His only evidence relative thereto was his own testimony, which
was to the effect that he knew nothing of the injury complained
of until nearly six months after its occurrance; that he did not
know or recall any activity, on the day in question, that would
have involved his presence at the scene of the alleged injury;
that there was a possibility that his car might have been there
and some one from his office could have been driving it; that he
had been treated at the Sinai Hospital, about six blocks from
the scene, and still makes visits there for medical care; and that
he had inquired among his employees and none of them recalled
any occasion for driving his car on the day in question, or at
that time being in the vicinity where the plaintiff received her
injury. 64
Grier contended that this state of the evidence entitled her to the
instruction denied. Rosenberg responded that the subject presumption
went out of the case with his testimony in reply. 65 The court of
appeals held "the instruction ... should have been given. ,,66 Although
the defendant gave sufficient evidence to present a jury question and
thus avoid a directed verdict,67 the presumption did not disappear
from the case. Judge Prescott formulated the rule for the court:
In cases of this nature, after the plaintiff has offered proof of
the ownership of the automobile in the defendant, if the
defendant does not offer any evidence on the issue of agency,
the Court should instruct the jury that if they find as a fact that
the defendant owned the car, they must find he is responsible
for the negligence (if any) of the driver. If the defendant does
present evidence to show that the alleged driver was engaged on
business or a purpose of his own, it may be so slight that the
Court will rule it is insufficient to be considered by the jury in
rebuttal of the presumption, in which case the Court should
grant the same instruction it would have granted if the
63. The plaintiff also sued the Baltimore Transit Company and its driver, but the judgments
upon jury verdicts in favor of these defendants were not appealed. [d. at 251, 131 A.2d
at 738.
64. [d. at 252, 131 A.2d at 739.
65. [d.
66. [d.
67. [d. at 255, 131 A.2d at 740.
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defendant had offered no evidence on the issue. The evidence
may be so conclusive that it shifts the burden or duty of going
forward with evidence back to the plaintiff, in which event the
defendant would be entitled to a directed verdict, if the
plaintiff does not produce evidence in reply, unless there is
already evidence in the case tending to contradict defendant's
evidence .... The evidence, however, may fall between the two
categories mentioned above, in which event the issue of agency
should be submitted to the jury.68
In terms of burden of proof, the court has said that a presumption
shifts a special burden of going forward with the evidence: the party
against whom the presumption operates must come forward with
evidence to the contrary which is more than "slight" in the judgment of
the trial judge. 69 If he does not meet this burden, the presumed fact
must prevail if the basic fact is found. But even if that special burden is
met, the party relying on the presumption is yet entitled to an
instruction relative to it, unless the usual burden of producing evidence
on the issue of agency is rebounded to him by "conclusive" evidence.
In mustering support for its decision"the court's rationale rang more
of a defense of its anti-Thayerian tactics than the affirmative statement
of policy which it was. Logically, Judge Prescott posed the question, "if
the instruction be not granted, how is the jury to know of the
presumption?,,70 The issue, however, is not "how" the jury should
know of the presumption, but whether or not they should know of it,
as a matter of jurisprudential policy. The court appeared to dabble in
policy when it referred to the possible reluctance of the jury to find the
owner liable if the presumption were not mentioned. 71 The court may
have been implying that because of a policy of broadening the
responsibility of vehicle owners for harm caused by their instrumentalities,72 the inference of agency arising from ownership73 needs a
boost in the eyes of the jury. The court quoted extensively from
McCormick, most notably his emphasis on the acceptance of the
practice elsewhere, and his view that the presumption should be
mentioned to impress upon the jury the law's attachment of special
significance to the basic fact. 74
68. 213 Md. at 254·55,131 A.2d at 740. To complete the rule, these words should be added
at the end of the last sentence: "with an instruction as to the terms of the presumption."
69.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to lay down a rule, that would apply in all
cases, as to when the evidence is so slight that it is insufficient to be considered by
the jury in rebuttal of the presumption of agency, or so conclusive as to require a
directed verdict for the defendant. These matters must depend upon, and be
decided by, the facts developed in each individual case. [d. at 255, 131 A.2d at
740.
70. [d. at 253, 131 A.2d at 739.
71. [d.
72. See p. 304 & note 21 supra.
73. See p. 312 note 82 & p. 314 infra.
74. 213 Md. at 253·54, 131 A.2d at 73940.
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Having made the threshold decision, in reliance on McCormick, to
allow mention of the presumption despite the conflicting evidence, the
court surely pondered the alternatives on instruction of the jury
considered by him.7s Possibly, the court might have approved another
form of instruction had the judges been concerned exclusively with
boosting the presumption at trial. Let us assume, nevertheless, that the
court of appeals, independently of the pressure of the instruction
before it, faced the secondary question of what to say to the jury, that
is, how to inject the presumption into the jury's deliberations. The
Grier injection was not clean. The instruction which should have been
given was that "if the jury found as a fact ownership of the car in the
appellee, there arose a rebuttable presumption that the automobile was
being operated by the appellee or by his agent. . . acting within the
scope of the agent's... employment. ,,76 The court said nothing
whatever with regard to whether or not, or how, the jury should be told
to deal with the presumption. The jury cannot simply divine what a
presumption is and how it should affect the case, and thus are left free
to do with it what they will. An individual juror might regard it as
conclusive; as evidence to be weighed; as meaning that the party against
whom it operates must disprove it; or he might not regard it at all. Yet
these are all possibilities which the court must have considered. In a
sense, then, the form of instruction approved is potentially self-defeating and may have been opted for by elimination. A rebuttable
presumption is not conclusive; it is not "evidence;" to the Grier court,
it should not shift the burden of persuasion; but it should be considered
by the jury in some manner. Perhaps the jurors would know that a
"rebuttable" presumption cannot be "conclusive." Perhaps they would
perceive that weighing a procedural rule in the balance does violence to
classical notions of evidence. Perhaps they would understand from the
charge in its entirety where the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion lies. But
perhaps they would not, and their task is difficult enough without
having to be performed in a mire of supposition. More than a statement
of the terms of the presumption is needed. 77
Grier was the first appellate reversal based on the giving or refusal to
give an instruction on the effect of a presumption. The only prior
"presumption cases,,78 involving directed verdicts were cases in which
the party against whom the presumption operated offered conclusive or
uncontradicted evidence in rebuttal. 79 One thing, however, is perfectly
clear-Maryland has never embraced the Thayer dogma. Although
before Grier dicta construable as Thayerian are to be found,80 the
75. The court of appeals relied on McCormick's 1959 edition, but the material there is
substantially the same as pp. 8·9 supra.
76. 213 Md. at 252, 131 A.2d at 738·39.
77. See the instruction in Phillips v. Cook, 239 Md. 215, 210 A.2d 743 (1965).
78. Cases in which an aspect of presumption law was the ratio decidendi.
79. See, e.g., Wagner v. Page, 179 Md. 465, 20 A.2d 164 (1941).
80. See, e.g., Gordon v. Rawles, 201 Md. 503, 512·13, 94 A.2d 465, 470 (1953) (emphasis
added): "Testimony in order to be legally sufficient to overthrow the presumption in
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weight of the language falls heavily on the side of a stronger procedural
effect, namely, imposition of a burden of proving the nonexistence of
the presumed fact. Cases involving the presumption of the legitimacy of
a child conceived or born during wedlock, the agency of the driver for
the owner of a vehicle, and the invalidity of a gift between persons in a
confidential relationship, indicate strongly that the person against
whom the presumption is directed must respectively convince the trier
of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that the child is
illegitimate,S 1 that the driver was not acting as a servant for the owner
in the scope of employment,82 and that the gift was voluntarily
given. 83 Regardless of the tendency, it is not possible to say that
Maryland has followed a one-rule approach; rather, the cases indicate a
presumption-by-presumption approach with an emphasis on according
presumptions a greater procedural potency than the bursting bubble
theory and many of its deviations.
Whether Grier, then, was one step in a chronological progression
toward giving presumptions a weightier significance or merely a
gap-filler in established law, it was not a turning point. Nevertheless,
Grier did, especially in conjunction with the cases which followed it,
give more form and substance to a somewhat amorphous area of
Maryland law. In view of the pre-Grier cases suggesting that presumptions, or certain presumptions, shift the burden of persuasion and the
language used by the court of appeals in Grier to the effect that the
presumption shifts only the burden of going forward with the
evidence,84 the question naturally arises as to who should receive a
verdict when the mind of the trier of fact is in equipoise, the party
relying on the presumption or the party against whom the presumption
operates. In Phillips v. Cook,85 a 1965 case involving personal injury to
the plaintiff as the result of an automobile accident, the evidence was
conflicting as to whether the driver of the car was acting in furtherance
of partnership business so as to render his partner liable for his
negligence, if any. After presenting the issue of agency to the jury and

81.
82.

83.
84.
85.

favor of a person's sanity and capacity ... must tend to show that he was incompetent at
that particular time." Even if the language in Gordon on the presumption of sanity calls
only for rebuttal evidence sufficient to support a finding of incompetence, a case decided
shortly after Grier in 1957 is contradictory: "The presumption that a person is sane ...
lasts until the contrary is established." Masius v. Wilson, 213 Md. 259, 268, 131 A.2d
484, 488 (1957).
See Clark v. State, 208 Md. 316, 320, 118 A.2d 366, 367 (1955); Scanlon v. Walshe, 81
Md. 118, 134,31 A. 498, 501 (1895). This presumption may involve special problems of
proof. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66F(b) (1957).
See, e.g., Erdman v. Henry S. Horkheimer & Co., 169 Md. 204, 206-07, 181 A. 221·22
(1935). Other cases indicate, however, that the inferential probative value of proof of
ownership may be the key to getting to the jury. See, e.g., Fowser Fast Freight v.
Simmont, 196 Md. 584, 588-89, 78 A.2d 178, 179-80 (1951).
See, e.g., Tribull v. Tribull, 208 Md. 490, 507, 119 A.2d 399, 408 (1956); Farmer v.
Associated Professors of Loyola College, 166 Md. 455,472,171 A. 361, 368 (1934);
McGill v. Nichols, 157 Md. 287, 294, 145 A. 773, 776 (1929).
Pp. 309-10 supra.
239 Md. 215, 210 A.2d 743 (1965).
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infonning them that finn ownership of the car raises a presumption
that it was being operated on firm business at the time of the accident,
the lower court instructed:
When I say it is a rebuttable presumption, what do I mean? ...
[I]t becomes the duty of the defendant ... to go forward with
the evidence to establish to your satisfaction by a fair
preponderance of the evidence that the car was not at that time
being operated on partnership business. 86
Despite the confused tenninology respecting burden of proof, there can
be no doubt that this instruction cast the risk of nonpersuasion upon
the defendant partner. The court of appeals found "no error in this
regard. ,,8 7
The first test of the Grier rule in the context of another presumption
occurred in 1964 in a federal forum. Maryland v. Baltimore Transit
Co. 88 was a diversity action brought for the death of plaintiff's
decedent who was hit and killed by a bus of the defendant company.
The evidence as to the decedent's due care was conflicting. The district
court judge refused a requested instruction that the jury could consider
the presumption of due care in the deceased's favor in reaching its
verdict, and instructed the jury: "[W]here as here, evidence has been
offered to show that the decedent failed to exercise ordinary care in a
number of respects, you shall consider the proof which has been
offered ... and you are not to rely on the presumption.,,89 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Maryland law, reversed the
judgments for the defendants and remanded. In the face of a strong
dissent by Judge Haynesworth, who argued that Maryland would not
apply the Grier fonnula to the presumption at issue and noted that
Grier took Maryland "out of the main stream of the prevailing current
of thought,,,90 the majority relied on Grier, applying its rule for the
first time to another presumption-the presumption of due care.
Judge Haynesworth proved wrong. In subsequent cases, the Maryland
Court of Appeals applied Grier to the presumption of due care. 91 The
court stated in Bratton v. Smith :92 "While recognizing that Grier dealt
with the presumption of agency, nevertheless its holding ... is apposite
to the principle underpinning the use of presumptions. ,,93 One
question which Grier left open has been answered-the rule there
announced has application to at least one other presumption.
86. ld. at 222, 210 A.2d at 748.
87.ld.
88. 329 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1964).
89. ld. at 739.
90. ld. at 745.
91. E.g., Gresham v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 256 Md. 500, 260 A.2d 649 (1970);
Bratton v. Smith, 256 Md. 695, 261 A.2d 777 (1970).
92. 256 Md. 695, 261 A.2d 777 (1970).
93. ld. at 702·03, 261 A.2d at 781.
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The court of appeals has neither prognosticated nor suggested in the
cases applying Grier how far its rule will be extended. 94 The
presumption of agency for which the rule was originally fashioned may
be said to be founded upon both the public policy of enlarging the
sphere of responsibility of owners for their vehicles and the circumstantial value of the fact of ownership.95 The presumption of due care
cannot claim this double distinction, for the fact of death does not
suggest that the decedent was exercising the prudence of a reasonable
man when he met his fate. Although it is often said that the
presumption issues from the instinct of survival,96 it is probably more
akin to giving the benefit of the doubt to one who cannot speak for
himself, which is a matter of the policy of the law. The common
denominator of public policy is certainly an indicator, but it is not a
mechanistic formula. The court of appeals will undoubtedly decide on a
presumption-by-presumption basis which ones merit the Grier effect.
All presumptions founded on some public policy should not be
accorded that effect, nor should all presumptions not primarily based
on public policy be denied it. Consider, for example, the presumption
of death from absence for seven years or more. The policy of
preventing property rights from being held in abeyance 97 is, in some
measure, counterbalanced by the drastic nature of declaring someone
dead. Even non-conclusive evidence that the person is not dead, or that
he has not been seen or heard from for some reason should remove the
presumption altogether, and require direct evidence to support the
finding. The Maryland legislature implied as much and more when it
abolished this common law presumption in these terms:
If the death of a person or the date of his death is at issue, he
is not presumed dead. . . merely because he has been absent
from his place of residence and not heard about for any stated
period of time. The issue shall go to the court as one of fact to
be determined upon the evidence.... 98

Even if the legislature had not abrogated the presumption, the same
rationale by the judiciary might well have exluded it from the embrace
of the Grier rule.
A presumption arising solely as a matter of inference, on the other
hand, such as that of receipt from proof of proper mailing, might well
deserve the Grier procedural effect by probability alone. But the
problem here is more in name than substance. "[O]ne may slip from
presumption to inference and back again too quickly for the eye, ear,
94. In Grier, the court prefaced its general formulation, pp. 309·10 supra, with the words "in
cases of this nature." 213 Md. at 254,131 A.2d at 740.
95. See p. 312 note 82 & p. 310 supra.
96. See, e.g., Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 194 Md. 421, 434,71 A.2d 442, 447(1950).
97. P. 304 supra.
98. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-102 (1974).
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or mind to detect.... [A]fter rebuttal of the presumption the
inference remains and may be treated as doing the same work as the
presumption even though the presumption is gone.'>99
What the court of appeals has wrought by Grier and its progeny is a
judgment that the values underlying presumptions, or at least some
presumptions, are not adequately supported by the law which banishes
them upon the appearance of non-conclusive contradictory evidence.
To the extent that the burden of persuasion is moved, even temporarily, this judgment rests by necessity upon a determination, though
sub silentio, that the policies dictating the original allocation of burden
of proof in the action have been countermanded. loo In effect, the Grier
rule has struck a balance between the bursting bubble extreme and that
called for by Morgan and McCormick lol -a final shifting of the burden
of persuasion. The boundaries of the Grier holding, however, have yet
to be drawn. The door is open to the Maryland attorney who relies
upon a presumption not yet assigned this effect, to persuade the court
that, in view of the nature of the presumption, the probative value of
the basic facts, the underlying policies, and, more specifically, the Grier
rationale,102 the presumption depended upon deserves such significance.
FEDERAL RULE 301
To promote uniformity in federal court practice, in February, 1973,
the Chief Justice of the United States reported to Congress proposed
rules of evidence for use in federal courts and before federal
magistrates. 103 As submitted by the Supreme COurt,104 Rule 301,
governing the effect of presumptions in cases controlled by federal law,
read:
In all cases not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by
these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it
is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the
presumed fact is more probable than its existence. lOS
99. Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. REV. 391,401 (1956).
100. MCCORMICK 826. For a discussion of the policies involved in the original allocation of
burden of proof, see id. § 337.
101. P. 307 supra.
102. Pp. 310 supra.
103. The rules were recommended by an Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, and
subsequently approved by the Judicial Conference Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure and by the Judicial Conference of the United States.
104. The Supreme Court promulgated three rules dealing with presumptions: Rule 301,
governing the effect to be given presumptions generally; Rule 302, prescribing when state
law as to the effect of presumptions was to be applied; and Rule 303, excepting from the
general rule presumptions operating against an accused in a criminal case. 41 U.S.L.W.
4023 (Nov. 21, 1972). Rule 303 was deleted by the Congress. See note 3 supra.
105. 41 U.S.L.W. 4023 (Nov. 21, 1972). Rule 302 "otherwise provides" for the applicability
of state law in certain cases. Pp. 318·21 infra.
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The Advisory Committee Note on Rule 301 explained simply that the
proposed rule shifting the risk of nonpersuasion was based upon a
determination that, in view of the policy considerations underlying the
creation of presumptions, the bursting bubble theory gave presumptions "too 'slight and evanescent' an effect. "106 The Advisory Committee, however, gave no indication whatsoever as to whether, in its
view, the proposed rule worked a change in existing federal law or was
simply a continuance of the manner in which federal courts were then
treating presumptions. The reason may be that the federal treatment of
presumptions was in a state of disarray.'07 At the time the Supreme
Court's proposed rule was under consideration, it was said both that it
rejected the prevailing view of the federal courts lOtl and that it was
"nothing more than a summary of existing law as to the treatment to
be given to presumptions by the Federal CourtS."109 Nevertheless, the
Court's rule did not survive long, Congress working its will initially
through the House of Representatives. I JO Rule 301 as amended and
passed by the House provided:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for
by Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on
the party against whom it is directed the burden of going
forward with the evidence, and, even though met with
contradicting evidence, a presumption is sufficient evidence of
the fact presumed, to be considered by the trier of the fact. III
The House Judiciary Committee, which adopted this "intermediate
position,""2 concurred in the Supreme Court's criticism of the
106. 46 F.R.D. 215, quoting from Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at
Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 913 (1937).
107. Compare, e.g., Psaty v. U.S., 442 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1971) and United Aniline Co.
v. Commissioner, 316 F.2d 701, 704 (1st Cir. 1963) with, e.g., Stout v. Commissioner,
273 F.2d 345, 350 (4th Cir. 1959) and Gersten v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 195, 199
(9th Cir. 1959). In 1938, the Supreme Court said, with respect to the presumption
against suicide, or in favor of accidental death:
The evidence being sufficient to sustain a finding that the death was not due to
accident ... the case stood for decision by the jury upon the evidence unaffected
by the rule that from the fact of violent death, there being nothing to show the
contrary, accidental death will be presumed. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer,
303 U.S. 161, 171 (1938).
108. Fornoff, Presumptions-The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 24 ARK. L. REV. 401,
408 (1971).
109. Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcommittee on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 2, at 221 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings J.
110. Under the "Rules Enabling Acts," 18 U.S.C. 3402, 3771,3772 (1970); 28 U.S.C. 2072,
2075 (1970), the Supreme Court's rules would have taken effect ninety days after they
were reported to Congress by the Chief Justice without action by Congress. Because of
the significance of the rules and, as some contended under enabling acts, the substantive
nature of some of the proposals, the Congress delayed the effective date of the rules until
Congress had an opportunity to enact them affirmatively. Act of March 30, 1973, Pub.
L. No. 93·12, 87 Stat. 9.
111. H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
112. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).

1976]

Presumptions

317

bursting bubble doctrine, but thought that a shift of the burden of
persuasion was too great an effect to accord pre sum ptions. 113
The Senate Judiciary Committee disagreed:
The committee feels the House amendment is ill-advised. As
the joint committees (the Standing Committee on Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference and the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence) stated: "Presumptions are not
evidence, but ways of dealing with evidence." This treatment
requires juries to perform the task of considering "as evidence"
facts upon which they have no direct evidence and which may
confuse them in performance of their duties. I 14
When the Senate completed its revision of Rule 301, the gamut had
been run-the Supreme Court's shift in the risk of non-persuasion was
permanently left behind, the House presumption-as-evidence rule had
been rejected, and the final step back to the bursting bubble theory was
taken. The Senate version was adopted by the Conference Committee
of both houses,\1S and Rule 301 enacted by the Congress\16 and
incorporated in the Federal Rules of Evidence now provides:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for
by Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on
the party against whom it is directed the burden of going
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but
does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of
the risk of non persuasion, which remains throughout the trial
upon the party on whom it was originally cast. I 17

In terms, this formulation is a bursting bubble rule. I II! The explication
of the operation of the rule given by the Committee of Conference,
however, exhibits either a fundamental misunderstanding of the theory
or an intent to modify it:
Under [the rule], a presumption is sufficient to get a party
past an adverse party's motion to dismiss made at the end of his
case-in-chief. If the adverse party offers no evidence contradicting the presumed fact, the court will instruct the jury that if it
finds the basic facts, it may presume the existence of the
presumed fact. If the adverse party does offer evidence
contradicting the presumed fact, the court cannot instruct the
jury that it may presume the existence of the presumed fact
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974).
Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93·595, 88 Stat._(1975).
Rule 30l.
See pp. 305·06 & notes 32·35 supra.
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from proof of the basic facts. The court may, however, instruct
the jury that it may infer the existence of the presumed fact
from proof of the basic facts. 119
The Committee's implication that a presumption will not necessarily
prevail in the absence of contradictory evidence is contrary to the most
basic tenent of presumption law. 120 Either the Committee's choice of
words is inexact or the federal courts will simply not abide by the
language, for when a party fails to sustain his burden of producing
evidence, the presumed fact controls. It is clear, however, that once
evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact,121 the presumption is gone, and must not
be mentioned to the jury, although the inference may remain in the
case of basic facts which are circumstantially probative. 122
FEDERAL RULE 302
The conflict between the bursting bubble theory of Rule 301 and the
greater procedural effect accorded presumptions under Maryland law
poses this immediate question: When will Maryland law govern the
effect of presumptions in federal court cases, and when will Rule 301
control? The answer is a function of the Erie doctrine 123 as formulated
with respect to presumptions 124 by the Supreme Court in Federal
Rule 302:
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption
respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense as to
which State law supplies the rule of decision is determined in
accordance with State law. 125

119.
120.
121.
122.

CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5·6 (1974).
P. 303 & note 13 infra; 29 AM. JUR. 2d, Evidence § 165 at 200 (1967).
See 1 J. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 301 [02], at 301·28 (1975).
See p. 314-15 supra. While the proscription against mentioning the word "presumption"
is sound Thayer doctrine, p. 306 & note 36 supra, the distinction between using the
word "presume" and the word "infer" appears superficial. McCormick points out that
the word "presume" may make an inordinately strong impression upon the jury.
MCCORMICK 825. Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger state that a reversal will not
necessarily follow from mention of the "dreaded word." WEINSTEIN & BERGER,SUpra note
121, at 301-28: "It is unlikely that it will be understood by the jury in its technical sense
rather than as a synonym for inference."
123. Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). As most commonly formulated, the doctrine
commands the application of the substantive law of the forum state by federal courts
exercising diversity jurisdiction. For a more refined analysis in the light of subsequent
cases, see C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 55-60 (2d ed. 1970). More accurately,
state substantive law applies if the issue presented to the court arises out of state-created
rights, regardless of the ground of jurisdiction. Id. at 226; K. REDDEN & S. SALTZBURG,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 56 (1975).
124. Advisory Committee Note, 46 F.R.D. 211.
125. Rule 302 as submitted by the Supreme Court was enacted by the Congress without
substantial change.
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Before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence the Erie
doctrine seemed to have comprehended state presumption law in toto,
for the federal courts in diversity cases routinely applied state law on
the effect of presumptions. 126 In 1959, the Supreme Court itself
applied North Dakota law on the effect of the presumption of
accidental death, or against suicide, arising from proof of violent death.
The plaintiff in Dick u. New York Life Ins. CO. 127 was the beneficiary
of two insurance policies issued by the defendant on the life of the
plaintiff's husband. The defendant had rejected the plaintiff's claims
under clauses providing for double indemnity in the event of accidental
death but excluding double indemnity in the event of suicide. The
defendant contended that the insured had taken his own life. At the
close of the evidence, the district court judge denied the insurer's
motion for a directed verdict and instructed the jury, in accordance
with North Dakota law, that accidental death is presumed and that the
insurer has the burden of persuasion. The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed/ 28 holding that, on the evidence, the issue should not
have been submitted to the jury and that the defendant's motion for a
directed verdict should have been granted. 129 The Supreme Court held
this to be error. 130 Under North Dakota law, a presumption not only
shifts the burden of persuasion but is considered as affirmative evidence
to be weighed. Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion concluded that
the evidence presented by the plaintiff, together with the presumption,
was sufficient proof of accidental death to present a jury question.
Although the Supreme Court did no more than apply state law in
finding that the court of appeals weighed the evidence improperly,
Chief Justice Warren's opinion broadly declared: "Under the Erie rule,
presumptions (and their effects) and burden of proof are 'substantive' .... "131 With the enactment of Rule 302, the question has been
raised whether the Erie doctrine and presumptions will maintain this
relationship.
Rule 302 declares that state law will control "the effect of a
presumption respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense
as to which state law supplies the rule of decision. 132 State law supplies
the rule of decision as to claims and defenses having their origin in state
law, or, more generally, in diversity cases. 133 It is the language
"respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense" which
126. E.g., Castilleja v. Southern Pacific Co., 406 F.2d 669, 675 (5th Cir. 1969) (applying
Texas law); Maryland v. Baltimore Transit Co., 329 F.2d 738 (4th Cir." 1964) (applying
Maryland law). See also 5 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE. ~ 43.08 at
43-89 to 43-90 (2d ed. 1975).
127. 359 U.S. 437 (1959). The plaintiff initially brought suit in North Dakota state court, but
the defendant removed the case to federal district court on diversity grounds. [d. at 438.
128. Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 252 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1958).
129. [d. at 47.
130. 359 U.S. at 445.
131. [d. at 446 (footnote omitted).
132. Rule 302.
133. See p. 318 & note 123 supra.
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must be scrutinized. Although on its face, this language might seem to
be no more than a codification of the Warren Court's assertion in Dick
that, for Erie purposes, presumptions are substantive, thus mandating
the application of state law, the Rule has affixed a qualification: the
presumed fact must be SUbstantively material to the' complainant's
recovery or the defendant's avoidance of liability. 134 According to the
Advisory Committee, this scope of the Erie doctrine in the field of
presumptions was the product of three Supreme Court cases, Dick and
two earlier cases involving original allocations of burden of proof. In
Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlop,135 the plaintiff sued to quiet title to
land, claiming status as a bona fide purchaser. The Supreme Court held
that the lower courts erred in failing to apply the Texas rule that the
burden was on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff was not a bona
fide purchaser. Palmer v. Hoffman l36 similarly involved state law
regarding burden of proof on the issue of contributory negligence.
Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger believe that Rule 302 evidences a
policy favoring the application of federal law over state law "in cases of
doubt" because "the draftsmen of the Rule deliberately chose to
interpret the Erie doctrine as narrowly as possible.,,137 Were this true,
the rule would have required as a prerequisite to the applicability of
state presumption law that the existence of the presumed fact must
tend to establish or disprove the claim or defense itself, rather than an
"element" of the claim or defense. It is probably more accurate to say
that Rule 302 embodies the Burger Court's more refined view of the
appropriate scope of the Erie doctrine as it applies to presumptions,
without ascribing any underlying functional policy.
It is clear, nevertheless, that Rule 302 contemplates instances in
diversity cases in which state law will not control the effect of
presumptions. The Advisory Committee Note refers to these instances
as "tactical presumptions" without further explanation. 13 /1 The term is
misleading in that it implies that particular presumptions may never be
governed by state law, regardless of their significance in the case.
Indeed, Weinstein and Berger were misled into citing as an example of a
tactical presumption, the presumption of receipt arising from proof of
proper mailing. 139 First, the federal courts have regularly followed state
law concerning the effect of this presumption. 140 Second, the receipt
of mailed matter is often an element of a claim or defense, for example,
in a suit for breach of warranty in regard to accepted goods where the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant was given reasonable notice of
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134. The Advisory Committee Note on Rule 302 states that the presumption must operate
upon a substantive element of the claim or defense. 46 F.R.D. 211. See also WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 121, at 302·05.
135. 308 U.S. 208 (1939).
136. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
137. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 121, at 302-05.
138. 46 F.R.D. 211.
139. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 121, at 302·04.
140. E.g., Federal Ins. Co. v. Summers, 403 F.2d 971, 975 (1st Cir. 1968).
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the breach. 141 It is not the nature or ongm of the particular
presumption which determines the applicability of state law, but the
materiality of the presumed fact in the case.
Although the Rule allows for a rather nebulous zone in which
non-material presumptions may not be governed by state law and
although the Burger Court's formulation of Rule 302 is, in terms, either
less broad or more precise than the Warren Court's statement in Dick,
Rule 302 will not measurably whittle down the applicability of state
law in appropriate federal cases. Certainly the Congress did not
contemplate such a result. While Rule 301, which originally proposed a
drastic departure from the bursting bubble theory, 142 was much
debated and amended,143 Rule 302 was not even debated. In enacting
Rule 302, the Congress undoubtedly viewed it as a maintenance of the
status quo. In addition, the foothold which state presumption law has
established in federal courts and the latitude available to federal judges
in originally determining the scope of Rule 302 militate against any
significant excision of state presumption law from the Erie doctrine.
Thus, the major task and opportunity of the advocate relying on a
presumption in a federal court applying Maryland substantive law will
not be to convince the court that state law should control the effect of
the presumption, but to persuade the court, as he must in a Maryland
forum 144 and as the plaintiff did in Maryland v. Baltimore Transit
CO.,145 that the law of Maryland would accord the presumption a
particular procedural effect.
J. Clinton Kelly

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-607(3)(a) (1975).
P. 315 supra.
Pp. 315-17 supra.
P. 315 supra.
329 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1964). See p. 313 supra.

